The Arrival of F50M

Yesterday (note - this was first published on my FB on 31 October 2026), the first of eighteen South Korean KAI FA-50M jets arrived in Malaysia. The arrival marked a major procurement milestone for the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF), representing its first major acquisition of combat aircraft in almost two decades.

The South Korean-designed jets arrived at a very critical juncture for the ageing air force. With the retirement of the Soviet-era MiG-29N Fulcrum and the decimation of both the Hawk 108 and 208 series fleets through operational attrition and crashes, the RMAF's combat capabilities have been severely curtailed. The loss of a very precious F/A-18D Hornet in 2025 was particularly keenly felt.

But the arrival of the FA-50M is not a fix-all solution. To a certain extent, it is a stop-gap measure. Here is why.

Before the FA-50M, the RMAF operated a hodgepodge of combat aircraft from three countries: the United States (F/A-18D Hornet), the United Kingdom (BAe Hawk 108 and 208), and Russia (Su-30MKM). That's three different logistical supply chains.

With Russia currently embroiled in the war in Ukraine and facing heavy sanctions, alternative supply chains had to be established, including one through India. China is also rumoured to be part of the supply chain for the RMAF's Su-30MKM fleet.

Add in the other wings of the air force (rotary, transport, and training), and you will have France and Italy in the mix. With the FA-50M, we will need to establish yet another logistical supply chain, this time with South Korea.

In terms of capabilities, the FA-50M is classified as a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). It does not fall within the classification of the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) that we have often been fed with over the last two decades. Thus, to some, it is seen as a downgrade.

Indeed, the FA-50M procurement programme was designed as a replacement for the Hawks. However, some of us, myself included, see the programme as an opportunity to fill the capability gap left by the MiG-29N, which is classified as an air-superiority fighter.

Regionally, the FA-50M is not a good benchmark against our neighbours' procurement programmes. Singapore is part of the F-35 programme, which involves a fifth-generation fighter. Indonesia has procured the French Rafale, a fourth-generation MRCA (though it must be said that Indonesia would have an even crazier logistical nightmare compared to us).

Whenever we compare our procurement programmes against those of our neighbours, detractors often roll their eyes in exasperation and point out that we should not be engaged in an arms race. They might add, "Do not covet thy neighbour's new car" (in our case, jets).

As much as I understand their rationale and stance, and hope that they are right, two of our neighbours have coveted parts of our country. Indonesia launched the failed Ganyang Malaysia campaign, which ultimately led to Indonesia's founding president, Soekarno, being deposed. Meanwhile, the Philippines' Oplan Merdeka under Ferdinand Marcos backfired, resulting in the Jabedah massacre, which triggered the Moro uprising.

But Malaysia being Malaysia, the government, irrespective of whichever administration is in power, has always downplayed these geopolitical threats. Indeed, even at the height of China Coast Guard (CCG) incursions into our Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), the situation is often downplayed and "solved" through the submission of diplomatic notes. You might even think that diplomacy was first founded in Malaysia.

Even the Indonesia-Malaysia Konfrontasi, which resulted from the Ganyang Malaysia campaign, was seen as just a confrontation, despite the shooting war.

Despite what might seem to be my misgivings about the procurement of the FA-50M, which I have aired above, I still see it as an opportunity for the RMAF to return to its former glory.

Should the FA-50M's performance prove satisfactory, the RMAF should press for the next batch. The high number of jets would theoretically reduce the operational cost per unit. Each aircraft would also get more rotation, allowing them to last longer.

Caveat emptor: no wars that would lead to their attrition.

Secondly, the FA-50M presents an opportunity for the RMAF to streamline its logistics. As the older jets are retired due to operational obsolescence and attrition, their respective supply chains can be closed.

Thirdly, with a sufficient number of aircraft (which I must emphasise in this parenthesis), the RMAF will be able to return to its roots.

In a way, while the FA-50M is supposed to replace the MiG-29N and the Hawks, the MiG-29N filled the space vacated by the F-5E II Fighting Tigers, though not in the sense of a one-to-one replacement. In terms of operational design philosophy, the FA-50M was intended to fill the space left behind by the Tigers.

The US had originally designed the F-5E as a lead-fighter programme for US-friendly nations, with the USAF getting the F-16s. However, US-friendly nations increasingly preferred to acquire the F-16 Falcons, skipping the Tigers altogether and ultimately killing the F-20 Tiger programme.

That said, the Turkish Hürjet programme may be interesting. While South Korea is not the US, the FA-50M does have much of its technological roots in the US. A US-imposed sanction, regardless of the reason, could still kill the FA-50M.

I have ranted enough. But, as always, do recheck my information, as my views may or may not be accurate. The interpretation, I leave to you.

(Note: I am getting lazier about doing that for you. And even if I do, you might still deem it invalid. You have your cake; I have mine.)

Beyond the Aircraft: The Geopolitics of Defence Procurement

In a recent write-up on the arrival of the FA-50M, one commentator laughed at the notion that Malaysia had avoided Russian jets to steer clear of the threat of sanctions, and compared the FA-50M procurement to Algeria's procurement of Russian-made Su-35s. The scoffing made me think (yes, my frontal lobe still functions).

Way back in my early years of observing defence procurement, when I was still technically a fanboy, I was also very oblivious to the mechanics of defence procurement. I wanted to see sleek, shiny, fast jets that could pull off amazing acrobatic moves because I equated them with invincibility. I looked at these qualities as if they were plot armour that would ensure we remained the best.

The phrase defence diplomacy was as alien to me as pillow talk between a Klingon and a Vulcan. In other words, it didn't make sense to me. Sanctions, as I understood them, were restrictions imposed by other countries to prevent a country from building the capabilities needed to wage war.

But as I became involved in activities aimed at improving the economy, my understanding of how sanctions work improved.

The effectiveness of sanctions as a disciplinary tool against targeted nations is dictated by two major factors: the level of integration of the targeted country into the global economy, and the importance of that country's resources to the global supply chain. There are other factors too, which we will look at in a simplified manner.

Let's start with the first point: the level of integration into the global economy. At USD 422.43 billion, Malaysia was ranked the 37th-largest economy in 2024 (IMF). The IMF estimates that it will rise to 34th place in 2026, with a GDP of USD 547.1 billion.

We are also very much entrenched in the global economy, be it in logistics, manufacturing, technology or even the financial sector. According to the Kearney Global Services Location Index, Malaysia is ranked third in terms of business process outsourcing (BPO). In the aeronautical industry, KL serves as a key MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) hub for Boeing. Airbus maintains a helicopter maintenance hub, while CTRM, an OEM manufacturer in Melaka, provides parts for both companies.

These are all potentially at risk should Malaysia have gone ahead with procuring Russian jets back in 2023, when it decided to procure the FA-50M. One point worth noting, though: there are two types of sanctions – official sanctions, which are published in official gazettes, and unofficial sanctions, which you know have been triggered when the pipeline gets cut off.

Let's not forget, too, that in 2017, the US introduced the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Following Türkiye's procurement of Russian S-400s, the US removed it from the vaunted F-35 programme. The removal, in a way, elevated Ankara's KAAN project from being a pet project to one of strategic importance.

Now, let's look at Ethiopia. With a GDP of USD 210 billion, Ethiopia was the 58th-largest economy in 2024. The IMF predicted that Ethiopia's economy might shrink to USD 127.15 billion in 2026, falling to 72nd place. However, as of 5 November 2026, the Ethiopian government had released new statistics that put its economy at USD 210.7 billion. Ethiopia did not grow larger overnight; rather, it rebased its statistical model, as the previous model had underrepresented many economic activities.

This itself is indicative of the long road ahead in increasing its integration into the global economy, with areas of economic activity only recently being recognised. Therefore, Ethiopia's economy remains less integrated and more unevenly developed compared to Malaysia's. Its key exports include agricultural products, textiles and gold. Its services sector is growing rapidly, and it is diversifying its international economic relationships to include BRICS.

As Ethiopia's economy grows and its integration into the global economy improves, it too will face similar concerns about its economic exposure.

Now, let's move on to the second point: the importance of the resources of the targeted country. For this, we need to look beyond Malaysia and Ethiopia. The best examples would be Russia and Iran.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (an operation Moscow officially calls a "special military operation"), Western governments imposed broad-based sanctions on Russia. As Russia is a major petroleum exporter, a complete ban on its exports would have had severe global repercussions. The G7 therefore allowed Russian petroleum to continue reaching international markets through permitted routes, subject to a price cap.

Similarly, Iran has been targeted by various sanctions regimes since the fall of Shah Pahlavi. China's economic growth requires enormous quantities of energy, and its position as a counterweight to Western hegemony has provided a lifeline to Tehran, reducing the effectiveness of sanctions in isolating Iran. With Iran holding the world's third-largest proven petroleum reserves, the Beijing–Tehran relationship is deeply strategic in nature. Both distrust the Western-led international order, and each has something the other needs.

Before I end my rant, let's look at some other factors that could have an impact on defence diplomacy. One of them is whether a country possesses nuclear weapons. Not just any type of weapon of mass destruction (WMD), but specifically nuclear weapons.

North Korea survives today partly because its nuclear arsenal serves as a major deterrent (and, of course, because of the support it receives from Beijing and Moscow). Then there is Muammar Gaddafi, whom some believe was killed partly because he voluntarily abandoned Libya's nuclear weapons programme. Some have speculated that this emboldened those seeking regime change in Tripoli. Whether that is true is a story worthy of a separate discussion altogether.

That's it! End of my rant. Feel free to correct me, as my knowledge isn't perfect and I don't have a crystal ball to confirm what I write. I may be wrong, too. Never discount that.