Way back in my early years of observing defence procurement, when I was still technically a fanboy, I was also very oblivious to the mechanics of defence procurement. I wanted to see sleek, shiny, fast jets that could pull off amazing acrobatic moves because I equated them with invincibility. I looked at these qualities as if they were plot armour that would ensure we remained the best.
The phrase defence diplomacy was as alien to me as pillow talk between a Klingon and a Vulcan. In other words, it didn't make sense to me. Sanctions, as I understood them, were restrictions imposed by other countries to prevent a country from building the capabilities needed to wage war.
But as I became involved in activities aimed at improving the economy, my understanding of how sanctions work improved.
The effectiveness of sanctions as a disciplinary tool against targeted nations is dictated by two major factors: the level of integration of the targeted country into the global economy, and the importance of that country's resources to the global supply chain. There are other factors too, which we will look at in a simplified manner.
Let's start with the first point: the level of integration into the global economy. At USD 422.43 billion, Malaysia was ranked the 37th-largest economy in 2024 (IMF). The IMF estimates that it will rise to 34th place in 2026, with a GDP of USD 547.1 billion.
We are also very much entrenched in the global economy, be it in logistics, manufacturing, technology or even the financial sector. According to the Kearney Global Services Location Index, Malaysia is ranked third in terms of business process outsourcing (BPO). In the aeronautical industry, KL serves as a key MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) hub for Boeing. Airbus maintains a helicopter maintenance hub, while CTRM, an OEM manufacturer in Melaka, provides parts for both companies.
These are all potentially at risk should Malaysia have gone ahead with procuring Russian jets back in 2023, when it decided to procure the FA-50M. One point worth noting, though: there are two types of sanctions – official sanctions, which are published in official gazettes, and unofficial sanctions, which you know have been triggered when the pipeline gets cut off.
Let's not forget, too, that in 2017, the US introduced the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Following Türkiye's procurement of Russian S-400s, the US removed it from the vaunted F-35 programme. The removal, in a way, elevated Ankara's KAAN project from being a pet project to one of strategic importance.
Now, let's look at Ethiopia. With a GDP of USD 210 billion, Ethiopia was the 58th-largest economy in 2024. The IMF predicted that Ethiopia's economy might shrink to USD 127.15 billion in 2026, falling to 72nd place. However, as of 5 November 2026, the Ethiopian government had released new statistics that put its economy at USD 210.7 billion. Ethiopia did not grow larger overnight; rather, it rebased its statistical model, as the previous model had underrepresented many economic activities.
This itself is indicative of the long road ahead in increasing its integration into the global economy, with areas of economic activity only recently being recognised. Therefore, Ethiopia's economy remains less integrated and more unevenly developed compared to Malaysia's. Its key exports include agricultural products, textiles and gold. Its services sector is growing rapidly, and it is diversifying its international economic relationships to include BRICS.
As Ethiopia's economy grows and its integration into the global economy improves, it too will face similar concerns about its economic exposure.
Now, let's move on to the second point: the importance of the resources of the targeted country. For this, we need to look beyond Malaysia and Ethiopia. The best examples would be Russia and Iran.
After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (an operation Moscow officially calls a "special military operation"), Western governments imposed broad-based sanctions on Russia. As Russia is a major petroleum exporter, a complete ban on its exports would have had severe global repercussions. The G7 therefore allowed Russian petroleum to continue reaching international markets through permitted routes, subject to a price cap.
Similarly, Iran has been targeted by various sanctions regimes since the fall of Shah Pahlavi. China's economic growth requires enormous quantities of energy, and its position as a counterweight to Western hegemony has provided a lifeline to Tehran, reducing the effectiveness of sanctions in isolating Iran. With Iran holding the world's third-largest proven petroleum reserves, the Beijing–Tehran relationship is deeply strategic in nature. Both distrust the Western-led international order, and each has something the other needs.
Before I end my rant, let's look at some other factors that could have an impact on defence diplomacy. One of them is whether a country possesses nuclear weapons. Not just any type of weapon of mass destruction (WMD), but specifically nuclear weapons.
North Korea survives today partly because its nuclear arsenal serves as a major deterrent (and, of course, because of the support it receives from Beijing and Moscow). Then there is Muammar Gaddafi, whom some believe was killed partly because he voluntarily abandoned Libya's nuclear weapons programme. Some have speculated that this emboldened those seeking regime change in Tripoli. Whether that is true is a story worthy of a separate discussion altogether.
That's it! End of my rant. Feel free to correct me, as my knowledge isn't perfect and I don't have a crystal ball to confirm what I write. I may be wrong, too. Never discount that.
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