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Tuesday, August 11, 2026

𝐁𝐞𝐲𝐨𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐑𝐞 π‡πžπšππ₯𝐒𝐧𝐞𝐬: π“π‘πž π’π­π«πšπ­πžπ π’πœ 𝐂𝐨𝐬𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐚 𝐌𝐒𝐬𝐬𝐒π₯𝐞 π–πšπ« 𝐨𝐟 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐒𝐭𝐒𝐨𝐧

A very interesting development indeed. The US - Iran war, which Israel had goaded the US to enter into, may have now severely affected the US and its allies within and outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 


Please note that the following assertion may reflect more of my personal views, biases, and understanding of the conflict, which definitely contradict what mainstream and counter-mainstream media have been portraying. When the US started the bombing campaign against Iran on the pretext of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, the supporters of the war declared that it was the only option. The US also claimed they need to defend Israel from Iranian ballistic missiles and drone attacks, despite Israel firing the first shots. 

Israeli supporters point out that Iran had been harming Israel via its various proxies in the Middle East, including accusations that Iran was aware of Hamas' plan for the October 7th attack. But Tehran and its regional proxies claimed they too were caught off guard, which Israeli intelligence confirmed; while Tehran and Hizbollah may have known of any attacks, they were unaware that Hamas was going to operationalise the plans. Rather, pressing queries by Israelis' own press pointed to Israeli military intelligence's possible knowledge of the impending attack having frequently been buried under a multitude of other new emerging news. 

But let's get back to the primary story and the analysis. As a result of the US being goaded to defend Israel despite its firing the first shots of the war, the US had expended a significant portion of its stockpile of Patriot interceptors. The New York Times reported that globally, the Patriot interceptor missile stockpile may be less than 1,700 units. 

The US Pentagon has denied the revelation, but it does not require access to US top-secret information to gain the information. Quantitative intelligence analysis could provide clues to the information. An often unspoken analytical approach, sometimes described by analysts as operational mathematics, could be used to estimate the level of consumption. Basically, it is a combination of different intelligence disciplines with statistical analysis and stresses the resulting estimates against different assumptions.

Open source intelligence (OSINT) could easily gather information on the number of Patriot missile interceptors expended by the US, Israel, and Ukraine in the last few years to estimate the missile consumption, and project the number against known Patriot missile production levels. Missile debris from consumed missiles adds an additional dimension, as these often have parts identification plates indicating the components' production date, which could provide estimation to how fast the missiles are being consumed. 

Even if the US tries to deny the alleged depletion of missile stocks, they have already moved out Patriot launchers and presumably the Patriot missile stockpile from South Korea, and delayed delivery of locally produced Patriot missiles to JASDF - the Japanese licensed missiles being used to restock the US stockpile instead. Both countries face threats from China and North Korea (although some people would insist that Japan and South Korea are threats to China and North Korea, respectively- this is just a matter of perspective). 

Ukraine, which is facing an immediate threat in its current war against Russia, has now depleted its stock of Patriot interceptor missiles. To mitigate the need to obtain missiles from the US, the US had agreed for Ukraine to manufacture licensed Patriot missiles. However, Ukraine's plan is now in jeopardy as there have been reports that Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and other Patriot missile interceptor component manufacturers have raised their concerns that Ukraine may find better and cheaper ways to build the missiles, thus undercutting their profit margin. 

Similarly, CNN has reported estimates that the US has expended nearly 80% of the prewar stockpile of THAAD missile system interceptors. The Centre for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) estimated that the US would require at least three years of heightened production levels to return the level of THAAD missiles to the prewar stockpile level.

Both systems are just cogs in a much larger war machine. While these systems are defensive in nature, to expect the enemy to stop their attacks because they have finished up their supplies of ballistic missiles is a fool's errand, especially when these systems could have been deployed to defend key production infrastructure. 

Then again, when have human beings, an emotion-driven species, ever been logical?

Sunday, August 2, 2026

𝐈𝐧𝐟𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐒𝐧 𝐭𝐑𝐞 π€π πž 𝐨𝐟 πƒπ«π¨π§πž π–πšπ«πŸπšπ«πž

In the book "The Gathering Storm" published in 1948, wartime British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill lamented that the War Office prepared its armies to fight yesterday's wars. The concept itself was far older. The first soldiers who brought swords to a gun battle learnt it the hard way, and so did the first soldiers defending the trenches when the first tanks emerged onto the battlefield. 

Technological advancement has pushed the frontier of revolution in military affairs to a new height. Drone warfare is an area which has seen a huge leap in terms of capability and capacity that is now probably limited only by our imagination and understanding of technology. 

π‘†π‘π‘œπ‘π‘’
Before we go any deeper into the drone rabbit hole, allow us to set up some level of expectation. We are not exploring drone tactics - other analysts and writers have focused on drone tactics. Nor are we exploring from the perspective of a world power with unfettered access to technology and a military force that could call up for fire support and reinforcement. 

In simpler words, we are focusing on the challenges more likely faced by nations that have finite resources. While we will be looking at the challenges faced by infantry forces, we will be using the phrase infantry in a general sense, encompassing existing infantry forces and non-combat function supporting units such as headquarters elements or logistics units that may find themselves forced into infantry roles, especially when their defensive position is being directly targeted by combat-capable UGVs. Now that we have set the baseline, let's move on onto the history of drone warfare.

π»π‘–π‘ π‘‘π‘œπ‘Ÿπ‘¦ π‘œπ‘“ π‘€π‘–π‘™π‘–π‘‘π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘¦ π·π‘Ÿπ‘œπ‘›π‘’
What started as a way to clear enemy positions using a single-use ground-based wired mobile mine by the German Wehrmacht took a backseat for years - the Goliath was over-engineered, costly, yet vulnerable. Thus degrading its battlefield and cost effectiveness.  

The introduction of the Predator drone in the mid-90s opened up a new frontier - drones that started as an ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) platform morphed into an armed platform capable of destroying ground targets. While being a pioneer, the platform was largely limited to the US and its allies, changing only one side of the battlefield balance. The platform is also seen more as unmanned aircraft, instead of a flying drone. In a way, the Predator comes from a totally separate lineage, i.e. from a reusable ISR platform. 

One of the earliest iterations of single-use devices would be the Israeli-made Harpy. The Harpy was designed as a loitering munition targeting enemy air defence.

One of the earliest instances of the commoditisation of drone warfare surprisingly came from the Daish, also known as the Islamic State. They flew commercially available drones armed with either hand grenades or mortar rounds, dropping the ordnance onto unsuspecting targets. 

𝐴𝑔𝑒 π‘œπ‘“ π·π‘Ÿπ‘œπ‘›π‘’ π‘Šπ‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘“π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘’
The Russo-Ukraine war became the impetus for the widespread use of drones in combat operations. Seeing the effectiveness of drone warfare, especially against armoured units, point defences, artillery guns, and especially infantry, nations scrambled to form their own drone forces. 

As nations scrambled to build their own drone forces, some nations belatedly realised they still need to set up counter-drone capabilities. Unfortunately, most countries' concept of counter-drone forces is focused around aerial drones. We will discuss this further down the line. 

π‘ˆπΊπ‘‰ (π‘ˆπ‘›π‘šπ‘Žπ‘›π‘›π‘’π‘‘ πΊπ‘Ÿπ‘œπ‘’π‘›π‘‘ π‘‰π‘’β„Žπ‘–π‘π‘™π‘’) - π‘‡β„Žπ‘’ 𝑁𝑒π‘₯𝑑 πΉπ‘Ÿπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘–π‘’π‘Ÿ
Drone warfare has evolved far more than merely first person view (FPV) drones carrying explosives. 

Enter the unmanned ground vehicle. Ukrainian forces have been deploying UGVs to conduct resupply and evacuation of wounded personnel; these efforts were well-documented. Realising the potential of these UGVs, the Ukrainians have modified some of these UGVs into combat-capable platforms, armed with .50 calibre M2 Brownings. Potential here refers not to the combat capability of these converted platforms but the expandability of these platforms when compared against the lives of their operators.

There are claims that these UGVs have held positions against Russian probing efforts, and on at least one occasion, had assaulted and captured Russian-held positions. More recently, there are talks of at least one sea-borne landing conducted by an USV (unmanned sea vessel) to land a UGV to conduct a ground assault. For this writing, we will not look into SGV deployment, considering we are looking solely at the threat posed by UGVs against infantry - further exploration into the SGV role in that particular operation would be better addressed as a separate article on how drones allow operators to fight wars without putting themselves in harm's way.  

What is unique about UGVs is that they trace their lineage to logistical needs, i.e. combat support instead of combat capability, which may explain why discussions on drone warfare often focus exclusively on FPV drones. 

Ukraine is not the only country that is looking at UGVs. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has already conducted combat training exercises with robotic dogs. 

Ukraine's apparent successes with combat-capable UGVs suggest either they managed to build a low-cost UGV fleet, or their UGVs have robust chassis and are capable of withstanding small arms fire. Let's not forget that less than a decade ago, no one could envision that an FPV drone could be deployed in ways that have pushed main battle tanks and armoured vehicles into near obsolescence. 

This brings us to the next question.

π‘‡β„Žπ‘’ π‘ƒπ‘Ÿπ‘œπ‘π‘™π‘’π‘š 
As shown by the Ukrainians, drone threats are not just coming from the air. Should combat-capable UGVs become a standard fixture in the future battlefield, there must also be a shift towards countering UGV threats. Existing small arms with intermediate cartridges may no longer be sufficient. While these small arms may be sufficient to defend against FPV drones, there is a high probability that UGVs will be up-armoured, especially to conduct assault against enemy positions. However, it should be highlighted that should a UGV take this path, its cost-effectiveness parameter may change.

𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑖-π‘‡π‘Žπ‘›π‘˜ π‘†π‘¦π‘ π‘‘π‘’π‘šπ‘  
While up-armoured UGVs could still be taken out using anti-tank systems, it would be unlikely to be cost-effective. Therefore, nations looking into building effective counter-drone units focusing against UGVs may need to consider improving their small arms to either be provided with armour-piercing rounds or move towards larger and heavier cartridges. 

πΊπ‘Ÿπ‘’π‘›π‘Žπ‘‘π‘’ πΏπ‘Žπ‘’π‘›π‘β„Žπ‘’π‘Ÿπ‘ 
Alternatively, nations may consider providing infantry units with either automatic grenade launchers (like the Mk19 AGL) or multi-shot grenade launchers (like the South African Milkor 40mm grenade launchers). The concussive nature of these grenade rounds could effectively damage or destroy the more sensitive components in the UGVs, rendering them ineffective. However, these rounds require an arming distance; UGVs that managed to breach the line would need alternative solutions. 

π»π‘’π‘Žπ‘£π‘¦ π‘€π‘Žπ‘β„Žπ‘–π‘›π‘’ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑠
Another possible solution would be deploying heavy machine guns to support infantry units. Heavy machine guns have already been deployed against lightly armoured vehicles. However, these require either fixed positions or to be vehicle-borne, both likely to be targeted using FPV during assaults. 

π΅π‘Žπ‘‘π‘‘π‘™π‘’ 𝑅𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑠
Should a higher calibre round be the solution against UGV threat, we may see the return of battle rifles to provide infantry forces enough firepower to take down UGVs. These battle rifles could be deployed either in the hands of specialist soldiers, or if needed, to infantry forces in general. Although not intended as anti-armour weapons, their full-power cartridges offer substantially greater penetration against hardened targets than intermediate-calibre assault rifles.

It is worth noting, though, that the polemic surrounding the inadequacy of intermediate rounds has been ongoing and had intensified during the so-called global war on terror, primarily due to the widespread use of Kevlar-based body armour and helmets rather than UGV. While the discussion on the inadequacy of intermediate rounds is worth a separate discussion on its own, global powers' approach to the issue is researching a more effective round. The US, for example, has introduced a new rifle and light machine gun utilising the new 6.8mm cartridge on a pilot basis. As our focus is on nations with lesser resources, the approach is operationally unfeasible as it requires the setting up of new capabilities that would impact its logistical infrastructure. 

πΆπ‘™π‘œπ‘ π‘–π‘›π‘”
Would these sets of predictions make sense? As mentioned earlier, ten years ago during the height of the so-called global war on terror, FPV drones were still far beyond operational reach, and no one would have been able to predict that their presence has revolutionised how wars are fought. Today? FPV drones are the frightening reality that becomes the last thing many Ukrainian and Russian servicemen ever see.

Sunday, March 12, 2023

RMAF FA50 Programme - Next?

The Malaysian Government's decision to procure the FA50 Fighting Eagle for Royal Malaysian Air Force's Light Combat Aircraft programme provides a new opportunity for the service branch to fix an oft-unspoken problem faced by the service. 

South Korean Republic of Korea Air Force (RoKAF) FA50. Source: RoKAF.

Sunday, February 26, 2023

They Spied for the Enemy - Stories of Traitors

Amidst the war in Ukraine between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, British news outlets published a piece of small yet possibly significant news. On Friday, the 17th of February 2023, British High Court found David Ballantyne Smith guilty of charges of spying for Russia. Smith, a former aircraftman with the Royal Air Force (RAF), worked as a security guard at the British Embassy in Berlin when he committed the offence.

Smith, photo taken by undercover agents during the sting operation. Photo credit: The Guardian.
 

Saturday, February 25, 2023

RMAF to get FA50 for LCA Programme

Yesterday (24th February 2023), Korean Aerospace Industries Co. (KAI) announced that they had won the bid to supply 18 units of FA50 to the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) for its Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme. The RM 4.1 billion (about USD 920 million) contract will see KAI deliver the combat aircraft to Malaysia beginning in 2026. 

South Korean Republic of Korea Air Force (RoKAF) FA50. Source: RoKAF.

Tuesday, February 21, 2023

High-Altitude Spying

It has been about half a month since the United States accused China of sending spy balloons into its airspace and spying on its critical military installations. The US had since downed the alleged spy balloon. Together with it, the US had also shot down three other unknown flying objects. US President Joe Biden on 17 February announced that the three objects downed later were not related to the first alleged spy balloon and were civilian. For the record, the three objects had been flying between the height of 20,000 to 40,000 feet and were a potential threat to civilian air traffic.

A screenshot of the alleged spy balloon.

Sunday, February 12, 2023

Navy Chief Intends to Upgun the LMS

Recently, the new Chief of the Navy, Datuk Abdul Rahman bin Ayob hinted that he intends to procure a new batch of armed Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) as part of his plan to rejuvenate the Navy.

Laksamana Datuk Abdul Rahman saluting the Guard of Honour at MINDEF. Photo credit: Cawangan Komunikasi Strategik, Markas Tentera Laut