The Arrival of F50M

Yesterday (note - this was first published on my FB on 31 October 2026), the first of eighteen South Korean KAI FA-50M jets arrived in Malaysia. The arrival marked a major procurement milestone for the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF), representing its first major acquisition of combat aircraft in almost two decades.

The South Korean-designed jets arrived at a very critical juncture for the ageing air force. With the retirement of the Soviet-era MiG-29N Fulcrum and the decimation of both the Hawk 108 and 208 series fleets through operational attrition and crashes, the RMAF's combat capabilities have been severely curtailed. The loss of a very precious F/A-18D Hornet in 2025 was particularly keenly felt.

But the arrival of the FA-50M is not a fix-all solution. To a certain extent, it is a stop-gap measure. Here is why.

Before the FA-50M, the RMAF operated a hodgepodge of combat aircraft from three countries: the United States (F/A-18D Hornet), the United Kingdom (BAe Hawk 108 and 208), and Russia (Su-30MKM). That's three different logistical supply chains.

With Russia currently embroiled in the war in Ukraine and facing heavy sanctions, alternative supply chains had to be established, including one through India. China is also rumoured to be part of the supply chain for the RMAF's Su-30MKM fleet.

Add in the other wings of the air force (rotary, transport, and training), and you will have France and Italy in the mix. With the FA-50M, we will need to establish yet another logistical supply chain, this time with South Korea.

In terms of capabilities, the FA-50M is classified as a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). It does not fall within the classification of the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) that we have often been fed with over the last two decades. Thus, to some, it is seen as a downgrade.

Indeed, the FA-50M procurement programme was designed as a replacement for the Hawks. However, some of us, myself included, see the programme as an opportunity to fill the capability gap left by the MiG-29N, which is classified as an air-superiority fighter.

Regionally, the FA-50M is not a good benchmark against our neighbours' procurement programmes. Singapore is part of the F-35 programme, which involves a fifth-generation fighter. Indonesia has procured the French Rafale, a fourth-generation MRCA (though it must be said that Indonesia would have an even crazier logistical nightmare compared to us).

Whenever we compare our procurement programmes against those of our neighbours, detractors often roll their eyes in exasperation and point out that we should not be engaged in an arms race. They might add, "Do not covet thy neighbour's new car" (in our case, jets).

As much as I understand their rationale and stance, and hope that they are right, two of our neighbours have coveted parts of our country. Indonesia launched the failed Ganyang Malaysia campaign, which ultimately led to Indonesia's founding president, Soekarno, being deposed. Meanwhile, the Philippines' Oplan Merdeka under Ferdinand Marcos backfired, resulting in the Jabedah massacre, which triggered the Moro uprising.

But Malaysia being Malaysia, the government, irrespective of whichever administration is in power, has always downplayed these geopolitical threats. Indeed, even at the height of China Coast Guard (CCG) incursions into our Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), the situation is often downplayed and "solved" through the submission of diplomatic notes. You might even think that diplomacy was first founded in Malaysia.

Even the Indonesia-Malaysia Konfrontasi, which resulted from the Ganyang Malaysia campaign, was seen as just a confrontation, despite the shooting war.

Despite what might seem to be my misgivings about the procurement of the FA-50M, which I have aired above, I still see it as an opportunity for the RMAF to return to its former glory.

Should the FA-50M's performance prove satisfactory, the RMAF should press for the next batch. The high number of jets would theoretically reduce the operational cost per unit. Each aircraft would also get more rotation, allowing them to last longer.

Caveat emptor: no wars that would lead to their attrition.

Secondly, the FA-50M presents an opportunity for the RMAF to streamline its logistics. As the older jets are retired due to operational obsolescence and attrition, their respective supply chains can be closed.

Thirdly, with a sufficient number of aircraft (which I must emphasise in this parenthesis), the RMAF will be able to return to its roots.

In a way, while the FA-50M is supposed to replace the MiG-29N and the Hawks, the MiG-29N filled the space vacated by the F-5E II Fighting Tigers, though not in the sense of a one-to-one replacement. In terms of operational design philosophy, the FA-50M was intended to fill the space left behind by the Tigers.

The US had originally designed the F-5E as a lead-fighter programme for US-friendly nations, with the USAF getting the F-16s. However, US-friendly nations increasingly preferred to acquire the F-16 Falcons, skipping the Tigers altogether and ultimately killing the F-20 Tiger programme.

That said, the Turkish Hürjet programme may be interesting. While South Korea is not the US, the FA-50M does have much of its technological roots in the US. A US-imposed sanction, regardless of the reason, could still kill the FA-50M.

I have ranted enough. But, as always, do recheck my information, as my views may or may not be accurate. The interpretation, I leave to you.

(Note: I am getting lazier about doing that for you. And even if I do, you might still deem it invalid. You have your cake; I have mine.)

Beyond the Aircraft: The Geopolitics of Defence Procurement

In a recent write-up on the arrival of the FA-50M, one commentator laughed at the notion that Malaysia had avoided Russian jets to steer clear of the threat of sanctions, and compared the FA-50M procurement to Algeria's procurement of Russian-made Su-35s. The scoffing made me think (yes, my frontal lobe still functions).

Way back in my early years of observing defence procurement, when I was still technically a fanboy, I was also very oblivious to the mechanics of defence procurement. I wanted to see sleek, shiny, fast jets that could pull off amazing acrobatic moves because I equated them with invincibility. I looked at these qualities as if they were plot armour that would ensure we remained the best.

The phrase defence diplomacy was as alien to me as pillow talk between a Klingon and a Vulcan. In other words, it didn't make sense to me. Sanctions, as I understood them, were restrictions imposed by other countries to prevent a country from building the capabilities needed to wage war.

But as I became involved in activities aimed at improving the economy, my understanding of how sanctions work improved.

The effectiveness of sanctions as a disciplinary tool against targeted nations is dictated by two major factors: the level of integration of the targeted country into the global economy, and the importance of that country's resources to the global supply chain. There are other factors too, which we will look at in a simplified manner.

Let's start with the first point: the level of integration into the global economy. At USD 422.43 billion, Malaysia was ranked the 37th-largest economy in 2024 (IMF). The IMF estimates that it will rise to 34th place in 2026, with a GDP of USD 547.1 billion.

We are also very much entrenched in the global economy, be it in logistics, manufacturing, technology or even the financial sector. According to the Kearney Global Services Location Index, Malaysia is ranked third in terms of business process outsourcing (BPO). In the aeronautical industry, KL serves as a key MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) hub for Boeing. Airbus maintains a helicopter maintenance hub, while CTRM, an OEM manufacturer in Melaka, provides parts for both companies.

These are all potentially at risk should Malaysia have gone ahead with procuring Russian jets back in 2023, when it decided to procure the FA-50M. One point worth noting, though: there are two types of sanctions – official sanctions, which are published in official gazettes, and unofficial sanctions, which you know have been triggered when the pipeline gets cut off.

Let's not forget, too, that in 2017, the US introduced the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Following Türkiye's procurement of Russian S-400s, the US removed it from the vaunted F-35 programme. The removal, in a way, elevated Ankara's KAAN project from being a pet project to one of strategic importance.

Now, let's look at Ethiopia. With a GDP of USD 210 billion, Ethiopia was the 58th-largest economy in 2024. The IMF predicted that Ethiopia's economy might shrink to USD 127.15 billion in 2026, falling to 72nd place. However, as of 5 November 2026, the Ethiopian government had released new statistics that put its economy at USD 210.7 billion. Ethiopia did not grow larger overnight; rather, it rebased its statistical model, as the previous model had underrepresented many economic activities.

This itself is indicative of the long road ahead in increasing its integration into the global economy, with areas of economic activity only recently being recognised. Therefore, Ethiopia's economy remains less integrated and more unevenly developed compared to Malaysia's. Its key exports include agricultural products, textiles and gold. Its services sector is growing rapidly, and it is diversifying its international economic relationships to include BRICS.

As Ethiopia's economy grows and its integration into the global economy improves, it too will face similar concerns about its economic exposure.

Now, let's move on to the second point: the importance of the resources of the targeted country. For this, we need to look beyond Malaysia and Ethiopia. The best examples would be Russia and Iran.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (an operation Moscow officially calls a "special military operation"), Western governments imposed broad-based sanctions on Russia. As Russia is a major petroleum exporter, a complete ban on its exports would have had severe global repercussions. The G7 therefore allowed Russian petroleum to continue reaching international markets through permitted routes, subject to a price cap.

Similarly, Iran has been targeted by various sanctions regimes since the fall of Shah Pahlavi. China's economic growth requires enormous quantities of energy, and its position as a counterweight to Western hegemony has provided a lifeline to Tehran, reducing the effectiveness of sanctions in isolating Iran. With Iran holding the world's third-largest proven petroleum reserves, the Beijing–Tehran relationship is deeply strategic in nature. Both distrust the Western-led international order, and each has something the other needs.

Before I end my rant, let's look at some other factors that could have an impact on defence diplomacy. One of them is whether a country possesses nuclear weapons. Not just any type of weapon of mass destruction (WMD), but specifically nuclear weapons.

North Korea survives today partly because its nuclear arsenal serves as a major deterrent (and, of course, because of the support it receives from Beijing and Moscow). Then there is Muammar Gaddafi, whom some believe was killed partly because he voluntarily abandoned Libya's nuclear weapons programme. Some have speculated that this emboldened those seeking regime change in Tripoli. Whether that is true is a story worthy of a separate discussion altogether.

That's it! End of my rant. Feel free to correct me, as my knowledge isn't perfect and I don't have a crystal ball to confirm what I write. I may be wrong, too. Never discount that.

3 Oktober

Hari ini, 3 Oktober 2026. Tiga puluh tiga tahun lalu pada tarikh ini, satu ketumbukan anggota tentera Amerika Syarikat yang terdiri daripada 75th Ranger Regiment, pasukan khas Delta, dan dibantu oleh 160th Special Operations Airborne Regiment (SOAR) melancarkan serangan ke atas Hotel Olimpik di tengah-tengah Pasar Bakara di Mogadishu, Somalia. Matlamat operasi untuk menahan orang kanan kepada pemimpin Somalia National Alliance (SNA), Jeneral Farrah Aideed. Sama ada akibat ego, atau atas sebab keselamatan operasi, pasukan pengaman PBB yang turut beroperasi di Mogadishu, langsung tak diberitahu terlebih dahulu.

Serangan yang dilancarkan oleh ketumbukan tersebut di bawah Task Force Ranger (TFR) itu yang dirancangkan hanya untuk mengambil masa beberapa jam berhadapan tentangan hebat. SNA ketika itu telah mengambil maklum keupayaan TFR yang telah berjaya melaksanakan lapan serbuan malam sebelum itu. Kali ini, serangan dilaksanakan siang hari, dan TFR berada di luar elemen kelebihan mereka. Sama ada TFR sedar atau tidak, atau mata mereka ditutup ego, pasukan SNA bukan setakat militia, tetapi termasuk bekas tentera Somalia yang kembali membantu puak masing-masing selepas tumbangnya kerajaan Somalia pimpinan Siad Barre. Ramai antara mereka memiliki pengalaman perang bukan sahaja dalam perang saudara negara mereka sendiri, tetapi juga pernah terlibat dalam perang Ogaden yang dilancarkan Siad Barre ketika gilakan kuasa.

Misi bertukar menjadi misi menyelamat apabila dua buah helikopter Black Hawk yang dibawa 160th SOAR telah ditembak jatuh dan terhempas di dua lokasi berbeza. Sebuah lagi Black Hawk mengalami kerosakan kritikal dan sempat diterbangkan balik ke pengkalan di Lapangan Terbang Mogadishu sebelum melaksanakan pendaratan cemas.

Panglima Operasi Amerika Syarikat mengarahkan pasukan 10th Mountain Regiment untuk membantu operasi menyelamat. Elemen USN Seal juga turut digerakkan - bilangan terlibat tidak diketahui dan hanya disebut sepintas lalu oleh Mark Bowden dalam buku beliau, Black Hawk Down, yang kemudiannya dijadikan sebagai filem oleh Scott Ridley.

Apabila keadaan bertambah meruncing, barulah mereka memohon bantuan daripada pasukan pengaman PBB yang memiliki keupayaan armor, yakni dari Malbatt dan Pakbatt. Elemen Malbatt terdiri daripada 19 RAMD. Terdapat sumber mengatakan bahawa GGK terlibat, tetapi tiada sumber rasmi mengesahkan penglibatan tersebut. Tetapi kehadiran GGK di Somalia selepas pertempuran tersebut dapat disahkan secara rasmi. Elemen Pakbatt pula terdiri daripada 7th Frontier Force dan satu unit lain, dilengkapkan dengan kereta kebal M48 Patton dan kenderaan berperisai M113. 

Di akhir operasi pada keesokan hari, seramai 18 anggota tentera Amerika Syarikat daripada pelbagai cabang terkorban. Itu pun, ada pertikaian sumber yang menyatakan 19 orang yang terkorban. Seorang juruterbang menjadi tawanan. Mayat lima anggota tentera US pula diheret dalam perarakan oleh militia Somalia.

Di pihak Malaysia, seorang anggota Malbatt, Prebet Mat Aznan Awang, terkorban dan diberikan kenaikan pangkat ke korporal. Lapan orang lagi cedera, dan empat buah kenderaan perisai Condor terpaksa dimusnahkan untuk mengelakkan kenderaan berkenaan jatuh ke tangan militia. Kisah pengorbanan Malbatt tertutup selama berdekad lamanya, dengan ada elemen yang diputarbelit di luar konteks, hanya terubat sedikit sebanyak selepas para veteran sendiri memperbetulkan kesilapan pandangan awam. 

Pakbatt diwar-warkan mengalami antara satu atau dua korban, tetapi Pakbatt tak pernah dedahkan identiti korban tersebut. Diwar-warkan, kerana sumbangan Pakbatt dalam pertempuran tersebut sering dipertikaikan. Dan juga dipertikaikan oleh para netizen Malaysia kerana filem Ridley Scott memaparkan askar yang menyelamatkan tentera Amerika Syarikat berupa seperti Pakistan. Pakbatt dipaparkan dengan lebih buruk seolah-olah hanya pandai membawa air teh di hujung filem. Sedangkan sumber sekunder kajian pertahanan Tentera Amerika Syarikat menyatakan dua anggota tentera Pakistan terkorban dalam pertempuran tersebut. Apakah kisah tentera Pakistan adalah kepingan kisah sejarah yang masih terpendam?

Di pihak Somalia, bilangan korban sebenar tidak dapat disahkan, antara 200 ke 800 orang. Bilangan berbeza disebabkan perang saudara Somalia telah menyebabkan infrastruktur negara berkenaan tumbang dan puak-puak bertelagah hanya menjaga orang sendiri sahaja. Lebih buruk, dalam Amerika Syarikar mengangkat nama anggota-anggota tentera mereka, dalam kita memperingati pengorbanan Malbatt, kita lupa, bukan semua warga Somalia yang terkorban hari tersebut adalah militia. Bukan semua adalah jahat. Bagi mereka, mereka mempertahankan negara mereka, puak mereka.

Sehingga ke hari ini, pelbagai versi kisah ini yang disebarkan, sama ada daripada tuan badan yang terlibat, saksi sebenar, dan media. Belum kira lagi salah faham yang disebarkan para penulis telur separuh masak (seperti saya). Belum kira lagi mengambil kira kisah anggota pasukan sokongan yang terlibat tetapi tidak diberikan pengiktirafan, seperti pasukan perubatan tentera Amerika Syarikat yang bertungkus-lumus menyelamatkan nyawa anggota-anggota yang tercedera termasuklah daripada Malbatt. Mereka pun ketagih pengorbanan mereka diiktiraf.  

Hari ini, kisah ini semakin banyak versi. Sehinggakan yang terbaru, ada pempengaruh Nigeria turut cuba mengambil kredit penglibatan dalam operasi berkenaan walaupun mereka belum masuk ke Mogadishu ketika itu. 

Apapun, pengajaran daripada kisah berdarah ini adalah lebih penting. Musuh negara bukan semestinya dari luar, malah dari dalam (perang saudara). Adakalanya, pemimpin negara itu sendiri adalah pencetus kepada tragedi yang lebih besar (Siad Barre yang menggunakan perang untuk merampas wilayah Ethiopia, dan kemudiannya mencetuskan pergaduhan antara puak untuk kekal berkuasa). Dan di tengah-tengah ini semua, pasti ada yang cuba menangguk di air yang keruh, cuba mendapat nama bagi diri yang tidak layak.

Akhir kata, kisah ini terlalu kompleks untuk sekadar menjadi satu penulisan semata-mata. Banyak lagi sisi yang tidak terungkai. Malah, ada mungkin sisi yang dirungkai dalam penulisan ini juga tidak betul dan menambahkan keruh dalam air yang sudah keruh. Maka, sekiranya berpeluang, sekiranya masih bernafas, kajilah, dan terus kajilah.

𝐁𝐞𝐲𝐨𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐇𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬: 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐒𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐜 𝐂𝐨𝐬𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐚 𝐌𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐥𝐞 𝐖𝐚𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧

A very interesting development indeed. The US - Iran war, which Israel had goaded the US to enter into, may have now severely affected the US and its allies within and outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 

Please note that the following assertion may reflect more of my personal views, biases, and understanding of the conflict, which definitely contradict what mainstream and counter-mainstream media have been portraying. When the US started the bombing campaign against Iran on the pretext of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, the supporters of the war declared that it was the only option. The US also claimed they need to defend Israel from Iranian ballistic missiles and drone attacks, despite Israel firing the first shots. 

Israeli supporters point out that Iran had been harming Israel via its various proxies in the Middle East, including accusations that Iran was aware of Hamas' plan for the October 7th attack. But Tehran and its regional proxies claimed they too were caught off guard, which Israeli intelligence confirmed; while Tehran and Hizbollah may have known of any attacks, they were unaware that Hamas was going to operationalise the plans. Rather, pressing queries by Israelis' own press pointed to Israeli military intelligence's possible knowledge of the impending attack having frequently been buried under a multitude of other new emerging news. 

But let's get back to the primary story and the analysis. As a result of the US being goaded to defend Israel despite its firing the first shots of the war, the US had expended a significant portion of its stockpile of Patriot interceptors. The New York Times reported that globally, the Patriot interceptor missile stockpile may be less than 1,700 units. 

The US Pentagon has denied the revelation, but it does not require access to US top-secret information to gain the information. Quantitative intelligence analysis could provide clues to the information. An often unspoken analytical approach, sometimes described by analysts as operational mathematics, could be used to estimate the level of consumption. Basically, it is a combination of different intelligence disciplines with statistical analysis and stresses the resulting estimates against different assumptions.

Open source intelligence (OSINT) could easily gather information on the number of Patriot missile interceptors expended by the US, Israel, and Ukraine in the last few years to estimate the missile consumption, and project the number against known Patriot missile production levels. Missile debris from consumed missiles adds an additional dimension, as these often have parts identification plates indicating the components' production date, which could provide estimation to how fast the missiles are being consumed. 

Even if the US tries to deny the alleged depletion of missile stocks, they have already moved out Patriot launchers and presumably the Patriot missile stockpile from South Korea, and delayed delivery of locally produced Patriot missiles to JASDF - the Japanese licensed missiles being used to restock the US stockpile instead. Both countries face threats from China and North Korea (although some people would insist that Japan and South Korea are threats to China and North Korea, respectively- this is just a matter of perspective). 

Ukraine, which is facing an immediate threat in its current war against Russia, has now depleted its stock of Patriot interceptor missiles. To mitigate the need to obtain missiles from the US, the US had agreed for Ukraine to manufacture licensed Patriot missiles. However, Ukraine's plan is now in jeopardy as there have been reports that Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and other Patriot missile interceptor component manufacturers have raised their concerns that Ukraine may find better and cheaper ways to build the missiles, thus undercutting their profit margin. 

Similarly, CNN has reported estimates that the US has expended nearly 80% of the prewar stockpile of THAAD missile system interceptors. The Centre for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) estimated that the US would require at least three years of heightened production levels to return the level of THAAD missiles to the prewar stockpile level.

Both systems are just cogs in a much larger war machine. While these systems are defensive in nature, to expect the enemy to stop their attacks because they have finished up their supplies of ballistic missiles is a fool's errand, especially when these systems could have been deployed to defend key production infrastructure. 

Then again, when have human beings, an emotion-driven species, ever been logical?

𝐈𝐧𝐟𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐀𝐠𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐃𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐞 𝐖𝐚𝐫𝐟𝐚𝐫𝐞

In the book "The Gathering Storm" published in 1948, wartime British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill lamented that the War Office prepared its armies to fight yesterday's wars. The concept itself was far older. The first soldiers who brought swords to a gun battle learnt it the hard way, and so did the first soldiers defending the trenches when the first tanks emerged onto the battlefield. 

Technological advancement has pushed the frontier of revolution in military affairs to a new height. Drone warfare is an area which has seen a huge leap in terms of capability and capacity that is now probably limited only by our imagination and understanding of technology. 

𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒

Before we go any deeper into the drone rabbit hole, allow us to set up some level of expectation. We are not exploring drone tactics - other analysts and writers have focused on drone tactics. Nor are we exploring from the perspective of a world power with unfettered access to technology and a military force that could call up for fire support and reinforcement. 

In simpler words, we are focusing on the challenges more likely faced by nations that have finite resources. While we will be looking at the challenges faced by infantry forces, we will be using the phrase infantry in a general sense, encompassing existing infantry forces and non-combat function supporting units such as headquarters elements or logistics units that may find themselves forced into infantry roles, especially when their defensive position is being directly targeted by combat-capable UGVs. Now that we have set the baseline, let's move on onto the history of drone warfare.

𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒

What started as a way to clear enemy positions using a single-use ground-based wired mobile mine by the German Wehrmacht took a backseat for years - the Goliath was over-engineered, costly, yet vulnerable. Thus degrading its battlefield and cost effectiveness.  

The introduction of the Predator drone in the mid-90s opened up a new frontier - drones that started as an ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) platform morphed into an armed platform capable of destroying ground targets. While being a pioneer, the platform was largely limited to the US and its allies, changing only one side of the battlefield balance. The platform is also seen more as unmanned aircraft, instead of a flying drone. In a way, the Predator comes from a totally separate lineage, i.e. from a reusable ISR platform. 

One of the earliest iterations of single-use devices would be the Israeli-made Harpy. The Harpy was designed as a loitering munition targeting enemy air defence.

One of the earliest instances of the commoditisation of drone warfare surprisingly came from the Daish, also known as the Islamic State. They flew commercially available drones armed with either hand grenades or mortar rounds, dropping the ordnance onto unsuspecting targets. 

𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒

The Russo-Ukraine war became the impetus for the widespread use of drones in combat operations. Seeing the effectiveness of drone warfare, especially against armoured units, point defences, artillery guns, and especially infantry, nations scrambled to form their own drone forces. 

As nations scrambled to build their own drone forces, some nations belatedly realised they still need to set up counter-drone capabilities. Unfortunately, most countries' concept of counter-drone forces is focused around aerial drones. We will discuss this further down the line. 

𝑈𝐺𝑉 (𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒) - 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟

Drone warfare has evolved far more than merely first person view (FPV) drones carrying explosives. 

Enter the unmanned ground vehicle. Ukrainian forces have been deploying UGVs to conduct resupply and evacuation of wounded personnel; these efforts were well-documented. Realising the potential of these UGVs, the Ukrainians have modified some of these UGVs into combat-capable platforms, armed with .50 calibre M2 Brownings. Potential here refers not to the combat capability of these converted platforms but the expandability of these platforms when compared against the lives of their operators.

There are claims that these UGVs have held positions against Russian probing efforts, and on at least one occasion, had assaulted and captured Russian-held positions. More recently, there are talks of at least one sea-borne landing conducted by an USV (unmanned sea vessel) to land a UGV to conduct a ground assault. For this writing, we will not look into SGV deployment, considering we are looking solely at the threat posed by UGVs against infantry - further exploration into the SGV role in that particular operation would be better addressed as a separate article on how drones allow operators to fight wars without putting themselves in harm's way.  

What is unique about UGVs is that they trace their lineage to logistical needs, i.e. combat support instead of combat capability, which may explain why discussions on drone warfare often focus exclusively on FPV drones. 

Ukraine is not the only country that is looking at UGVs. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has already conducted combat training exercises with robotic dogs. 

Ukraine's apparent successes with combat-capable UGVs suggest either they managed to build a low-cost UGV fleet, or their UGVs have robust chassis and are capable of withstanding small arms fire. Let's not forget that less than a decade ago, no one could envision that an FPV drone could be deployed in ways that have pushed main battle tanks and armoured vehicles into near obsolescence. 

This brings us to the next question.

𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚 

As shown by the Ukrainians, drone threats are not just coming from the air. Should combat-capable UGVs become a standard fixture in the future battlefield, there must also be a shift towards countering UGV threats. Existing small arms with intermediate cartridges may no longer be sufficient. While these small arms may be sufficient to defend against FPV drones, there is a high probability that UGVs will be up-armoured, especially to conduct assault against enemy positions. However, it should be highlighted that should a UGV take this path, its cost-effectiveness parameter may change.

𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖-𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 

While up-armoured UGVs could still be taken out using anti-tank systems, it would be unlikely to be cost-effective. Therefore, nations looking into building effective counter-drone units focusing against UGVs may need to consider improving their small arms to either be provided with armour-piercing rounds or move towards larger and heavier cartridges. 

𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠

Alternatively, nations may consider providing infantry units with either automatic grenade launchers (like the Mk19 AGL) or multi-shot grenade launchers (like the South African Milkor 40mm grenade launchers). The concussive nature of these grenade rounds could effectively damage or destroy the more sensitive components in the UGVs, rendering them ineffective. However, these rounds require an arming distance; UGVs that managed to breach the line would need alternative solutions. 

𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐺𝑢𝑛𝑠

Another possible solution would be deploying heavy machine guns to support infantry units. Heavy machine guns have already been deployed against lightly armoured vehicles. However, these require either fixed positions or to be vehicle-borne, both likely to be targeted using FPV during assaults. 

𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑠

Should a higher calibre round be the solution against UGV threat, we may see the return of battle rifles to provide infantry forces enough firepower to take down UGVs. These battle rifles could be deployed either in the hands of specialist soldiers, or if needed, to infantry forces in general. Although not intended as anti-armour weapons, their full-power cartridges offer substantially greater penetration against hardened targets than intermediate-calibre assault rifles.

It is worth noting, though, that the polemic surrounding the inadequacy of intermediate rounds has been ongoing and had intensified during the so-called global war on terror, primarily due to the widespread use of Kevlar-based body armour and helmets rather than UGV. While the discussion on the inadequacy of intermediate rounds is worth a separate discussion on its own, global powers' approach to the issue is researching a more effective round. The US, for example, has introduced a new rifle and light machine gun utilising the new 6.8mm cartridge on a pilot basis. As our focus is on nations with lesser resources, the approach is operationally unfeasible as it requires the setting up of new capabilities that would impact its logistical infrastructure. 

𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔

Would these sets of predictions make sense? As mentioned earlier, ten years ago during the height of the so-called global war on terror, FPV drones were still far beyond operational reach, and no one would have been able to predict that their presence has revolutionised how wars are fought. Today? FPV drones are the frightening reality that becomes the last thing many Ukrainian and Russian servicemen ever see.

RMAF FA50 Programme - Next?

The Malaysian Government's decision to procure the FA50 Fighting Eagle for Royal Malaysian Air Force's Light Combat Aircraft programme provides a new opportunity for the service branch to fix an oft-unspoken problem faced by the service. 

South Korean Republic of Korea Air Force (RoKAF) FA50. Source: RoKAF.

They Spied for the Enemy - Stories of Traitors

Amidst the war in Ukraine between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, British news outlets published a piece of small yet possibly significant news. On Friday, the 17th of February 2023, British High Court found David Ballantyne Smith guilty of charges of spying for Russia. Smith, a former aircraftman with the Royal Air Force (RAF), worked as a security guard at the British Embassy in Berlin when he committed the offence.

Smith, photo taken by undercover agents during the sting operation. Photo credit: The Guardian.