In the book "The Gathering Storm" published in 1948, wartime British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill lamented that the War Office prepared its armies to fight yesterday's wars. The concept itself was far older. The first soldiers who brought swords to a gun battle learnt it the hard way, and so did the first soldiers defending the trenches when the first tanks emerged onto the battlefield.
Technological advancement has pushed the frontier of revolution in military affairs to a new height. Drone warfare is an area which has seen a huge leap in terms of capability and capacity that is now probably limited only by our imagination and understanding of technology.
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Before we go any deeper into the drone rabbit hole, allow us to set up some level of expectation. We are not exploring drone tactics - other analysts and writers have focused on drone tactics. Nor are we exploring from the perspective of a world power with unfettered access to technology and a military force that could call up for fire support and reinforcement.
In simpler words, we are focusing on the challenges more likely faced by nations that have finite resources. While we will be looking at the challenges faced by infantry forces, we will be using the phrase infantry in a general sense, encompassing existing infantry forces and non-combat function supporting units such as headquarters elements or logistics units that may find themselves forced into infantry roles, especially when their defensive position is being directly targeted by combat-capable UGVs. Now that we have set the baseline, let's move on onto the history of drone warfare.
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What started as a way to clear enemy positions using a single-use ground-based wired mobile mine by the German Wehrmacht took a backseat for years - the Goliath was over-engineered, costly, yet vulnerable. Thus degrading its battlefield and cost effectiveness.
The introduction of the Predator drone in the mid-90s opened up a new frontier - drones that started as an ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) platform morphed into an armed platform capable of destroying ground targets. While being a pioneer, the platform was largely limited to the US and its allies, changing only one side of the battlefield balance. The platform is also seen more as unmanned aircraft, instead of a flying drone. In a way, the Predator comes from a totally separate lineage, i.e. from a reusable ISR platform.
One of the earliest iterations of single-use devices would be the Israeli-made Harpy. The Harpy was designed as a loitering munition targeting enemy air defence.
One of the earliest instances of the commoditisation of drone warfare surprisingly came from the Daish, also known as the Islamic State. They flew commercially available drones armed with either hand grenades or mortar rounds, dropping the ordnance onto unsuspecting targets.
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The Russo-Ukraine war became the impetus for the widespread use of drones in combat operations. Seeing the effectiveness of drone warfare, especially against armoured units, point defences, artillery guns, and especially infantry, nations scrambled to form their own drone forces.
As nations scrambled to build their own drone forces, some nations belatedly realised they still need to set up counter-drone capabilities. Unfortunately, most countries' concept of counter-drone forces is focused around aerial drones. We will discuss this further down the line.
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Drone warfare has evolved far more than merely first person view (FPV) drones carrying explosives.
Enter the unmanned ground vehicle. Ukrainian forces have been deploying UGVs to conduct resupply and evacuation of wounded personnel; these efforts were well-documented. Realising the potential of these UGVs, the Ukrainians have modified some of these UGVs into combat-capable platforms, armed with .50 calibre M2 Brownings. Potential here refers not to the combat capability of these converted platforms but the expandability of these platforms when compared against the lives of their operators.
There are claims that these UGVs have held positions against Russian probing efforts, and on at least one occasion, had assaulted and captured Russian-held positions. More recently, there are talks of at least one sea-borne landing conducted by an USV (unmanned sea vessel) to land a UGV to conduct a ground assault. For this writing, we will not look into SGV deployment, considering we are looking solely at the threat posed by UGVs against infantry - further exploration into the SGV role in that particular operation would be better addressed as a separate article on how drones allow operators to fight wars without putting themselves in harm's way.
What is unique about UGVs is that they trace their lineage to logistical needs, i.e. combat support instead of combat capability, which may explain why discussions on drone warfare often focus exclusively on FPV drones.
Ukraine is not the only country that is looking at UGVs. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has already conducted combat training exercises with robotic dogs.
Ukraine's apparent successes with combat-capable UGVs suggest either they managed to build a low-cost UGV fleet, or their UGVs have robust chassis and are capable of withstanding small arms fire. Let's not forget that less than a decade ago, no one could envision that an FPV drone could be deployed in ways that have pushed main battle tanks and armoured vehicles into near obsolescence.
This brings us to the next question.
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As shown by the Ukrainians, drone threats are not just coming from the air. Should combat-capable UGVs become a standard fixture in the future battlefield, there must also be a shift towards countering UGV threats. Existing small arms with intermediate cartridges may no longer be sufficient. While these small arms may be sufficient to defend against FPV drones, there is a high probability that UGVs will be up-armoured, especially to conduct assault against enemy positions. However, it should be highlighted that should a UGV take this path, its cost-effectiveness parameter may change.
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While up-armoured UGVs could still be taken out using anti-tank systems, it would be unlikely to be cost-effective. Therefore, nations looking into building effective counter-drone units focusing against UGVs may need to consider improving their small arms to either be provided with armour-piercing rounds or move towards larger and heavier cartridges.
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Alternatively, nations may consider providing infantry units with either automatic grenade launchers (like the Mk19 AGL) or multi-shot grenade launchers (like the South African Milkor 40mm grenade launchers). The concussive nature of these grenade rounds could effectively damage or destroy the more sensitive components in the UGVs, rendering them ineffective. However, these rounds require an arming distance; UGVs that managed to breach the line would need alternative solutions.
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Another possible solution would be deploying heavy machine guns to support infantry units. Heavy machine guns have already been deployed against lightly armoured vehicles. However, these require either fixed positions or to be vehicle-borne, both likely to be targeted using FPV during assaults.
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Should a higher calibre round be the solution against UGV threat, we may see the return of battle rifles to provide infantry forces enough firepower to take down UGVs. These battle rifles could be deployed either in the hands of specialist soldiers, or if needed, to infantry forces in general. Although not intended as anti-armour weapons, their full-power cartridges offer substantially greater penetration against hardened targets than intermediate-calibre assault rifles.
It is worth noting, though, that the polemic surrounding the inadequacy of intermediate rounds has been ongoing and had intensified during the so-called global war on terror, primarily due to the widespread use of Kevlar-based body armour and helmets rather than UGV. While the discussion on the inadequacy of intermediate rounds is worth a separate discussion on its own, global powers' approach to the issue is researching a more effective round. The US, for example, has introduced a new rifle and light machine gun utilising the new 6.8mm cartridge on a pilot basis. As our focus is on nations with lesser resources, the approach is operationally unfeasible as it requires the setting up of new capabilities that would impact its logistical infrastructure.
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Would these sets of predictions make sense? As mentioned earlier, ten years ago during the height of the so-called global war on terror, FPV drones were still far beyond operational reach, and no one would have been able to predict that their presence has revolutionised how wars are fought. Today? FPV drones are the frightening reality that becomes the last thing many Ukrainian and Russian servicemen ever see.
